Would territorial retreats whet Vladimir Putin’s imperialist appetite?
I’d be rich if I had a hryvnia for every time I’ve heard that question answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, if one concedes an inch to Putin, he’ll take a mile. And, naturally, that mile will only be the prelude to many more miles. In sum, you can’t concede an inch—or else.
Critics of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s “peace plan” for the Donbas enclave controlled by Russia and its terrorist proxies generally make this argument. Providing the enclave with a special status and effectively conceding Russian control of the territory isn’t just a “capitulation.” It’s an invitation to further Russian aggression.
Let’s unpack the arguments for inches becoming miles.
Supporters of this view—let’s call them pessimists— generally assume several things. First, that Putin desires to grab all of Ukraine and as much of Europe as he can. Second, that every territorial concession is a valued prize for Putin. Third, that Putin has the capacity to absorb enormous amounts of territory. Fourth, that Ukraine and other target countries have no influence on Putin’s appetite. And fifth, that Putin is immune to pain in his quest for empire. Let’s call the people who question some or all of these assumptions optimists.
The first assumption gets at the question that’s been obsessing analysts for years: just what the heck does Putin want? If you’re an optimist, you’re likely to believe that Putin wants hegemony over Ukraine and glory for Russia. If you’re a pessimist, you probably think Putin, like his ideological twins Aleksandr Dugin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, wants to capture Lisbon and nuke Tallinn. I submit that this question is unanswerable. We just don’t know, and we can’t even be sure that Putin knows. That said, given the stakes, we would be wise to agree with pessimists and assume the worst.
The second assumption rests on the view that all territorial acquisitions are equally valuable and, hence, equally desirable. But that’s obviously false. Imperialists generally want prize real estate and eschew barren deserts. Seen in this light, neither the Crimea nor the Donbas enclave is much of a prize: the former is turning into an economic mess, the latter has been reduced to a hell hole by Russian predations. True, both regions represent gains for Putin inasmuch as they are (still) home (sort of) to ethnic Russians supposedly pining for annexation to Russia. On the other hand, any further move into Ukraine will entail more destruction and increasingly fewer Russian “piners,” with the value of additional real estate thereby falling accordingly.
The third assumption rests on the view that seizing territory is easy. But, pace the ease of the Crimean annexation, most annexations are, like the Donbas annexation, extremely messy affairs, entailing military campaigns, human losses, economic distress, and enormous financial costs. And then there’s the problem of administering the occupied territories. For one thing, the occupier must eliminate the inevitable resistance. For another, the occupier must divert resources from the homeland to the occupied territories. Does Putin really want to be fighting Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, and many other partisan movements—and thereby repeat the bloody experience the USSR had with these nations after World War II?
The fourth assumption rests on the view that countries willing to make territorial adjustments will always accede to countries insisting on territorial adjustments. But why should they? As the above paragraph suggested, a further invasion of Ukraine or Eastern Europe will definitely produce resistance. If so, why shouldn’t potential invadees do everything possible to prevent invasions? Such as build defensive fortifications, arm and train their armies, and develop alliances? And why shouldn’t those defensive measures suffice to prevent expansionist countries from taking additional territory?
The answer to that last question leads straight into the fifth assumption: that Putin is immune to pain. According to pessimists, Putin will keep advancing regardless of the losses Russia incurs in his march to the Atlantic. How likely is that? If Russia suffers enormous pain, it may become objectively incapable of marching to Lisbon, even if Putin wants it to. (Remember that Hitler’s will proved powerless to stop Nazi Germany’s defeat.) And how likely is Putin to remain unaffected by Russia’s pain? If he’s completely bonkers, the answer is completely. If he has a twinge of rationality in him, then, sooner or later, the pain will make a difference in his calculations—not because he’s a humanitarian, but because he’ll see that a weak Russia will never reach Lisbon.
These are not just abstract reflections. They concern the Crimea, the Donbas enclave, and perhaps more of Ukraine. It is probably true that the ease of Russia’s conquest of the Crimea led Putin to believe that he could just as easily take another bite out of Ukraine. But the Donbas war has been anything but a cakewalk for Russia and its terrorist proxies. Ukraine has fought back and stopped the Russian advance. “The result,” according to Russian analyst Konstantin Gaaze, “was a dirty, bloody tie.”
Will Putin’s experience in the Donbas further whet his appetite or will it curb it? Three of the above five assumptions don’t hold for the Donbas enclave: the territory is no prize, the Ukrainians have fought hard, and Putin has paid a high price. Will the pain associated with these factors influence Putin? If he’s rational, yes. If he’s irrational, then Lisbon better prepare for a Russian assault.
But the really important question is this: Will Putin be emboldened if Ukraine accepts the enclave’s frozen status and uses the breather to build fortifications, reform its army, strengthen its arsenal, and enhance its ability to inflict pain on Russian invaders? I don’t see how those actions could possibly increase Putin’s appetite. They may not dull it—if he’s irrational—but even then, an objectively improved defense could stop Putin even if he believes otherwise. On the other hand, if absolutely nothing can stop Putin, then Europe and Russia are doomed, regardless of whether territorial retreats whet his imperialist appetite or not.
What, then, are the implications for rational policymakers? That’s easy. Regardless of whether you’re an optimist or a pessimist, the mere possibility of Putin’s unleashing a war against European civilization should be enough for rational European policymakers to appreciate that stopping Putin in the Donbas is infinitely preferable to stopping him farther west.
Photo Credit: www.kremlin.ru
