The fighting in the Donbas may be winding down, but Ukraine’s war with Russia will continue as long as Vladimir Putin believes that Ukraine must become his subject.
Now more than ever Ukraine’s survival as a democratic Western state depends on the continued strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability and the acceleration of reform.
An ostensibly peaceful Russia wedded to imperial expansion is no less of a military threat to Ukraine than an openly hostile Russia wedded to imperial expansion. The West is too preoccupied with its own problems and too indifferent to Putin’s destruction of the post-war international order to save Ukraine.
Only Ukraine can protect itself from further Russian predations by acquiring a first-class military able to deter all but the craziest of Russian leaders. Meanwhile, a first-class military is impossible without a strong economy, which in turn is impossible without serious, sustained reform.
As difficult as introducing reform has been, it’s about to get much harder—for two reasons.
First, the seeming end to fighting will incline some Ukrainian policymakers to conclude that the Russian threat has waned and that they can relax.
Second, it now looks like Ukraine may actually have to reintegrate the Donbas enclave sometime in the near future. I’ve been arguing ad nauseam that Ukraine would be infinitely better off by keeping the enclave on the other side of a high wall. Alas, my argument may be about to become moot, as—or if—Minsk-2 is implemented.
Signed in February 2015, the Minsk-2 accords propose a series of steps—a cease-fire, an exchange of prisoners, a constitutional amendment regarding the Donbas enclave’s status, Russian withdrawal, local elections, and Ukrainian control of the enclave’s border with Russia—that are supposed to end the war and usher in peace. The problem with the deal is that Ukraine expects Minsk-2 to lead to its reassertion of sovereignty, that Russia expects it to produce Ukrainian subservience, and that the separatists expect it to reinforce their rule.
It’s therefore perfectly possible that Minsk-2 will break down, as all sides realize there is no way to finesse their incompatible demands. The result could be a frozen conflict, with the added advantage that Russia might be reluctant to renew hostilities and incur sanctions. Were that to happen, Kyiv should formally declare that the Donbas enclave is occupied territory that falls under the purview of the occupying power, Russia.
If Putin’s proxies are less strategically daft than he is, they might push for reintegration and thereby put Ukraine in the hot seat. As absolutely everyone knows, the enclave—and indeed the whole Donbas, even the part occupied by Ukrainian forces—has been and still is ruled by criminal clans, criminal oligarchs, criminal mafias, and—the latest twist—criminal separatists and criminal warlords. Most of the population is unremittingly hostile to everything the new Ukraine stands for. The economy is in ruins.
If anyone knows how Ukraine is supposed to reintegrate this cancerous region without infecting itself in the process, please tell me.
The challenge would be enormous even if Ukraine defeated the Russian separatists and occupied the territory. And Ukraine has not defeated the rebels. Nor will it ever occupy the enclave and impose its will without reigniting the war.
Instead, Ukraine will have to reintegrate an unreconstructed and unreconstructable region. That’s what Minsk-2 mandates. And that’s been the declared goal of the Ukrainian political establishment.
As they say, be careful what you wish for. It may come true.
There’s only one way for a potentially reintegrated Donbas enclave to wreak minimal damage on Ukraine.
Kyiv should quarantine the territory and its thugs by giving it, and them, almost complete sovereignty within a confederal relationship with Ukraine.
Neither Kyiv nor the enclave would interfere in each other’s internal or external political affairs. Both sides would pursue their own economic policies, refrain from subsidizing each other, keep all the taxes they collect, and pursue trade with whomever they desire. Each side would be responsible for law and order, speak whichever language it desires, remember what it wants to remember, and honor whomever it wants to honor. Other issues would be stickier (Would there be one army or two? Would the enclave pursue its own foreign policy? Would there be one president or two?), but not immune to creative solutions.
Russia and its separatist thugs—along with France, Germany, and the United States—would be hard-pressed to say nyet to such a deal, while Kyiv and Ukraine’s hotheads could claim victory and declare that Ukraine is whole again.
Do confederations work in the medium to long term? Rarely, unless, as in the case of the Swiss, there are special circumstances that overcome the centrifugal forces built into them.
If the Ukrainian confederation works, great. Ukraine proper will reform, while the enclave goes to the hell of its choice. If the confederation doesn’t work and both sides agree to go their own way—perhaps like the Czechs and the Slovaks—what’s not to like?
