Foreign policymakers and analysts intone “autonomy” for the Russian-occupied Donbas enclave with tedious regularity, almost as if they were in possession of some magic formula. One of the latest to join the chorus was NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.
In fact, invocation of autonomy is at best an evasion, at worst meaningless.
For starters, the Donbas, like Crimea, effectively enjoyed vast autonomy since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Local political elites—their latest manifestation was Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions—ruled Luhansk and Donetsk provinces in cahoots with organized crime and oligarchs, foremost among them being the multibillionaire Rinat Akhmetov. Kyiv had almost nothing to say about their political, economic, and social policies. Russian language and culture reigned supreme, while Ukrainian language and culture were absent from the public realm, a fact that pro-autonomy proponents of “protecting” Russian from nonexistent Ukrainian “nationalist” assaults conveniently overlook.
In any case, while more regional autonomy is a good idea for all of Ukraine, the Donbas actually weakens the case for decentralization, suggesting that it leads to the formation of regional clans that exploit people, steal like mad, whip up chauvinist passions, and promote war for their own nefarious ends.
But the main reason for viewing autonomy as a bogus solution for the occupied Donbas enclave is that it means completely different things for the parties involved—Kyiv and the separatists. Implementation of the Minsk accords has made little progress beyond the ratty cease-fire, partly because the separatists and Russia violated the agreement from day one and mostly because there is no way that Kyiv and the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” can agree.
Understandably, Kyiv insists on the region’s de-militarization and on fair and free elections to determine who will run things. To agree to anything less would be to abandon all pretense of Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty. After all, states are supposed to have a monopoly of violence; they cannot countenance the presence on their territory of armed militias. By the same token, sovereignty means that states set the rules according to which elites and sub-elites are chosen. Kyiv has stated that, if the current separatists are elected in fair and free elections, it would recognize them. But for sovereignty to have any content, Kyiv must insist on elections held according to its rules.
No less understandably, the separatists insist on retaining their militias and on remaining in power—demands that are diametrically opposed to, and irreconcilable with, Kyiv’s minimal requirements. To make matters worse, Vladimir Putin’s proxies simultaneously maintain that they are already independent and that they would be happy to remain within Ukraine’s fold under maximally autonomous conditions. That’s nonsense: you cannot be independent and not independent at the same time.
How can this circle be squared?
It can’t. Kyiv must insist that Ukraine is a sovereign state, while the separatists must insist on remaining in power. Which is why I’ve been suggesting with no less tedious regularity that Ukraine would do well to freeze the conflict and let the enclave drift away. That way, Ukraine doesn’t recognize the people’s republics, while effectively enabling the separatists to run them into the ground, with, presumably, minimal negative effects for Ukraine proper. This won’t stop the fighting, at least not immediately. Even though Kyiv rejects using force to win back the enclave, Russia’s proxies still say they have the right to “liberate” at least all of the Donbas. Over time, however, the continued decay of the enclave will, or should, erode the separatists’ war-fighting ability. In any case, since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov believes the enclave should be part of Ukraine, we can be certain that keeping it out is the right thing to do.
Of course, mine is a halfway measure. If Kyiv were bold, it would countenance giving the occupied territories the independence that its separatist leaders say they want or have. Think about it. If Kyiv took the initiative, it could, in one fell swoop, establish clarity in its east. If the enclave were independent, all talk of “civil war,” autonomy, and “economic blockades” would cease, and the only issue would be the Russian war against Ukraine proper. The West would be happy to see the problem of the Donbas go away, and, with the conflict reduced to its stark Russo-Ukrainian dimension, a diplomatic solution might actually be easier to find. In the meantime, Ukraine and the enclave could establish whichever relations they like, but only if both sides found them mutually profitable.
Sounds great, except that this approach would outrage Ukraine’s hyper-patriots and the pro-Kyiv eastern Ukrainians who’ve been fighting for their homeland in the Donbas. Populist mobilization and popular discontent could even lead to a march on Kyiv or, heaven forbid, a third Maidan.
So are we back to square one or might this particular circle be squared?
A prominent democratic western Ukrainian policymaker, the 50-year-old Taras Stetskiv, has recently suggested just how the impossible might happen. He recommends holding a binding plebiscite in the occupied territories, with the choices being unification with Ukraine or independence. But here’s the rub. Even though chances are the enclave would opt for independence, it’s not at all clear that the separatists would let the ballot go ahead. After all, to do so would be to accept Kyiv’s rules, which they reject a priori.
And that brings us back to square one: keeping the enclave at arm’s length (and, as a side benefit, poking Lavrov in the eye). In time, the separatist-controlled territory is likely to acquire the accoutrements of independence, while Ukraine, bathed in blissful indifference to the enclave, continues on its path toward the West. A few years from now, “autonomy” would be moot, as Ukraine and the enclave will have drifted so far apart as to exist in different worlds. Sort of like Putin and the West.
